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This miscellaneous volume, edited by Damien Janos, includes a short 
introduction, eleven essays in chronological order by John W. Watt, Alexander 
Treiger, Ute Pietruschka, Orsolya Varsányi, Damien Janos himself, Philippe 
Vallat, Gerhard Endress, Olga Lizzini, Carmela Baffioni, David Bennett with 
Robert Wisnovsky, and David Twetten, and a bibliography of studies entitled 
‘Syriac and Arabic Christian philosophy and the Baghdad school’. 
Despite its subtitle—Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between Christians 
and Muslims in the Third/Ninth and Fourth/Tenth Centuries—it focuses mainly on the 
philosophical rather than theological inter-cultural exchanges between 
Christians and Muslims in the ninth- and tenth-century Baghdad. This is 
confirmed by Janos’s words in the Introduction where he states that the volume 
aims ‘to highlight the role that the Arabic Christian philosophers played in the 
elaboration of the vibrant and cosmopolitan intellectual culture that flourished 
in medieval Baghdad’ (p. 1). This role has often been studied in isolation from the 
development of mainstream Islamic philosophy, and this volume proposes a 
more dynamic approach.  
It is a matter of fact that in medieval Baghdad, Christians cooperated to put in 
place an ever-growing number of books, were protagonists of a prolific scribal 
activity, studied the same texts which, translated from Greek and Syriac into 
Arabic, were studied by Muslims, debated together with them on a set of shared 
philosophical questions, and elaborated with them ‘a universal language based on 
logic to transcend cultural and religious divides and differences’ (p. 2). But 
philosophical and theological cross-pollination does not mean in Baghdad the 
cancellation of any religious identity: logic and philosophy were at times 
                                                             
*  Damien Janos (ed.), Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges 
between Christians and Muslims in the Third/Ninth and Fourth/Tenth Centuries, (Islamic History and 
Civilization. Studies and Texts, 124), Brill: Leiden–Boston, 2015. This note was presented at the 
Philosophical Review Club (University of Leuven) on 12 October 2017. 
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instruments of inter-faith debate and apologetics. Hence this book explores the 
intellectual interactions, both peaceful and polemical, between Christians and 
Muslims, all heirs of the classical heritage, which was assimilated and adapted in 
accordance to their own needs.  
Opening the volume, John W. Watt in his ‘The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition 
and Syro-Arabic Baghdad Philosophers’ (pp. 7–43) analyses the Syriac 
Aristotelian tradition, and the activity of the Syro-Arabic philosophers in 
Baghdad. This is done not from the perspective of their alleged instrumental role 
in transmitting Greek texts to the subsequent Arab readership, but from that of 
their philosophical original approach and agenda. Probably because of the fact 
that he already dealt with the topic extensively elsewhere,1 Watt omits to 
reconstruct the school and social contexts of the figures he analyses and his 
otherwise very fascinating account at times would require more information.  
He begins with the analysis of the early, pre-Abbasid phase of Syriac 
philosophy and in particular from Sergius of Rēsh‘aynā, the Syriac scholar who 
was most influential on the later tradition. According to Watt, the main features 
of Sergius’s philosophical project are three.  
First, he considers as the proper object of philosophical studies the whole 
Aristotelian school corpus.2 Second, he thinks of Aristotelian philosophy as an 
                                                             
1  John W. Watt, ‘From Sergius to Mattā: Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius in the Syriac Tradition’, 
in Josef Lössl and John W. Watt (eds), Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity: The 
Alexandrian Commentary Tradition between Rome and Baghdad, London–New York: Routledge, 2011, 
pp. 39–57. 
2  Unfortunately for us even if his intention was to comment on the entire corpus, only his 
Commentaries on the Categories are extant. Sergius is traditionally considered the author of two 
comments of different length to Aristotle’s Categories, which we distinguish with the help of the 
name of their dedicatee. One is addressed to a certain Philotheos and it is preserved in MS 
Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Syr. 88 (= Peterman 9). Its title is Memrā Composed by Sargīs the 
Archiater of Riš'ainā on the Categories of Aristotle, the Philosopher. Cf. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, ‘Les 
Catégories d’Aristote comme introduction à la philosophie, dans un commentaire syriaque de 
Sergius de Rēš‘ainā (d. 536)’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 8 (1997), pp. 339–
363; Sami Aydin (ed.), Sergius of Reshaina: Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, Addressed to 
Philotheos, (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 24), Leiden: Brill, 2016. The other, a bit longer than the 
previous one, is addressed, according to the manuscripts, to a certain Theodore, bishop of Karḫ 
Ğuddān near the future Sāmarrā, the dedicatee of other works by Sergius as, for example, his 
Syriac version of the Περὶ κόσμου. This second commentary is preserved in three different 
manuscripts. The most ancient one is MS London, British Library, Add. 14658. It is acephalous 
and it misses the preface and the first book of the treatise. In the other two manuscripts, MS 
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Syr. 354 and MS Birmingham, Selly Oak Colleges 
Library, Mingana syr. 606, the commentary is respectively entitled Treatise Composed by Sargīs 
the Archiater on the Aims of all Aristotle’s Writings and Treatise Composed by Sargīs the Archiater on the 
Aims of the Categories of Aristotle from Stagire According to his Lineage and Philosopher According to his 
Species. Here, Sergius presents his work as the first commentary of a series of commentaries to 
all the writings of Aristotle that have not been preserved: ‘We will […] speak as (well as) we can 
about the aim of each one of these treatises, beginning the chain with that On categories, which 
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elite activity for those who could read Aristotle in Greek: his primary task was 
that to present an exposition of Aristotle, not a translation.3   
Third, his Aristotle is similar, but not identical to that of his Alexandrian 
teacher Ammonius Hermiae who states: ‘the purpose and obvious utility [which] 
the Aristotelian philosophy has for us […] [is] to ascend to the common origin of 
all things and to be aware that this is the one goodness itself, incorporeal, 
indivisible, infinite, and of infinite potentiality’ (p. 9).4 Near the end of his 
Commentary on the Categories, Sergius stated clearly that without logic not only 
medicine and philosophy cannot be understood, but neither ‘can the true sense 
be uncovered of the divine Scriptures, wherein lies the hope of our salvation’.5 
And in his Memrā on the spiritual life,6 which is prefaced to his translation of 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Sergius speaks about the true spiritual 
contemplation (theoria), which purifies the intellect and raises it to the height of 
the truth. This contemplation is divided into seven orders: the first ‘subsists by 
means of demonstrations and combinations of worded statements’ (i.e. the Logic 
of Analytics p. 10), while the last is the ‘finest flower’ which ‘touches the exalted 
radiance of the hidden divinity’, ‘the unfathomable radiance of Being’.7 Between 
the two we can recognize the other parts of Aristotelian curriculum and the 
doctrine of contemplation of Evagrius of Pontus. Sergius is close to his 
Alexandrian education, but also to the Christian intellectual tradition: the 
Aristotelian philosophy is ‘a part of a route by which intellect ascends to the 
                                                                                                                                                           
is about simple namings [or predications], and similarly treating each one of them [the Organon 
to the Rhetoric], in the same way. Then we will go on to his other treatises, those on the parts of 
practice, (then) physics and mathematics, and (then) the last ones which are called divine 
(Sergius, In Cat., fol. 3r)’, see Janos (ed.), Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond, p. 9, n. 4. 
According to Henri Hugonnard-Roche, ‘Comme la cicogne au désert. Un prologue de Sergius de 
Rēš‘ainā à l’étude de la philosophie aristotélicienne en syriaque’, in Alain de Libera, Abdelali 
Elamrani-Jamal and Alain Gallonnier (eds), Langages et philosophie. Hommage a Jean Jolivet, (Études 
de philosophie médiévale, 74), Paris: Vrin, 1997, p. 167, this series of commentaries to all 
Aristotle’s writings probably had never been written.  
3  Cf. the Introduction to Aydin (ed.), Sergius of Reshaina: Introduction to Aristotle, p. 51. According to 
Sami Aydin a significant fact speaks against Watt’s opinion that Sergius envisaged his 
commentary to be read together with the Greek version of the Categories. He writes: ‘Sergius’ 
text is thematically organised and various questions are briefly introduced and discussed in a 
way that the line of reasoning is comprehensible even independently from the text of Aristotle. 
The study of a source text obviously benefits from a lemmatic commentary and therefore, if 
Sergius intended his exposition to be used as a complement to the Categories, also he ought to 
have formed it in that way.’  
4  Ammonius, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, ed. Adolf Busse, Berolini: Typ. et impr. Reimer, 
1895, p. 6.9–12. 
5  Sergius, In Cat., fols 60r–61r, in Janos (ed.), Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond, p. 10, n. 7. 
6  Polycarp Sherwood, ‘Mimro de Serge de Rešayna sur la vie spirituelle’, L’Orient syrien 4 (1960), 
pp. 433–457; 6 (1961), pp. 95–115, pp. 122–156. 
7  Sherwood, ‘Mimro de Serge de Rešayna’, 6 (1961), pp. 122–123. 
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source of being’ (p. 11), but while for his Alexandrian teachers the higher part 
was laid out by the ‘divine Plato’, for Sergius the higher part was the Bible 
interpreted by Evagrius of Pontus and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. 
According to Watt this replacement had a deep impact for subsequent Syriac and 
Syriac-Arabic Christianity. In this perspective Logic is a necessary instrument to 
the true understanding of Scriptures, not a tool for contemporary Christological 
controversies.   
After the archiater Sergius and before the Abbasids, if there was any place 
where Aristotelian philosophy was taught, this was Qenneshre, the monastic 
school on the Euphrates. Almost all the well-known Syriac Aristotelian scholars 
of the seventh century were connected to this monastery.  
From the marginal notes of the Arabic manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, Ar. 2346 we know that Athanasius of Balad translated 
(partially or completely?) Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations. 
Athanasius also translated the Isagoge in 645. Jacob of Edessa made the revision of 
the previous anonymous translation of the Categories; George, Bishop of the Arab 
tribes translated the Categories, On interpretation, and the two books of the Prior 
Analytics. According to Watt it is evident that the seven-volume Organon was 
studied8 and it was studied in a sequence, which leads to apodeictics (this aim is 
explicitly stated in Severus Sebokht’s introduction to his short work on the 
syllogisms of the Prior Analytics). From the extant translation and commentaries 
of George, it is clear that Aristotle was not only read, but commented upon also 
using some of the late-antique commentators. There is no indication for the 
common assumption that the prime purpose of the logical works was their use in 
Christological controversies.  
There are no indications of translations of Physics, De Caelo, De Generatione et 
Corruptione, there are some quotations of the definition of ‘nature’ from 
Metaphysics, book Delta, in the Hexaemeron of Jacob of Edessa.9   
The reading of Aristotle in Greek was softened even if the Syriac translations 
of that period mirrored the Greek texts and were hardly understandable without 
a teacher proficient in Greek. In addition, Athanasius translated and revised the 
previous translations of Gregory of Nazianzus and pseudo-Dionysus. Watt 
concludes:  
 
                                                             
8  Hence beyond Prior Analytics I.7: the critical discussion of this debated point is at pp. 13–14, n. 
22. Cf. Henri Hugonnard Roche, ‘Syriac Studies’, Studia Graeco-arabica 3 (2013), pp. 233–244, in 
particular pp. 242–244. 
9  Cf. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, ‘Le corpus philosophique syriaque aux VIe-VIIe siècles’, in Cristina 
D’Ancona (ed.), The Libraries of the Neoplatonists, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 
107), pp. 279–291. 
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As with Sergius, their interest in Aristotle may well have been founded on the 
conviction that he supplied Dionysius’s ‘philosophic and demonstrative’ strand in 
double curriculum, the other being the ascetic and mystical which led to the 
contemplation of the divine’ (p. 16). 
 
On the figure of Timothy, the East Syrian patriarch from 780 to 823, who died one 
century after the death of George, the Bishop of the Arab tribes (d. 724) the last 
scholar associated to Qenneshre, I think that some remarks must be added. Watt 
considers him as a good example of the transmission of the West Syrian study of 
Aristotle, as exemplified at Qenneshre, to the East Syrians. Timothy was educated 
in the Monastery of Bashosh and was close to the Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdī and his 
family. From his letter 48 to Sergius, metropolitan of Elam and his old classmate, 
we know that he knew Athanasius of Balad’s translations of the Posterior Analytics 
and Topics.10 Watt wonders why not Athanasius of Balad’s translations of Prior 
Analytics and Sophistical Refutations. Probably Timothy knew even the Poetic: in his 
letter 19 he asks Sergius, metropolitan of Elam, to find him the two books of 
Poetic, because he had only the first one, as well as the commentaries on Logic by 
Olympiodorus, Stéphanus of Alexandria, Sergius of of Rēsh‘aynā and Alexander of 
Aphrodisias.11 From the famous letter 43, which inform us about Timothy’s 
translation of Topics from Syriac to Arabic, addressed to Pethion of Mar Gabriel in 
Mossul we know that he sought for commentaries or scholia on Topics, Rhetoric, 
Poetic and Sophistical refutations.12 In letter 42, addressed to the students of the 
monastery of Mar Gabriel, he explains a passage from Isagoge (Porph., Isag., pp. 
10.22–11.1) and another from Categories (Arist., Cat. 5, 3b10–23), and we know that 
he had some interest in Physics: he knew On generation and corruption.13 We do not 
know if he knew all these texts in Greek, Syriac or both. 
What motivated him to study Aristotelian philosophy? Watt writes: ‘Polemical 
disputation with Christians of a rival confession is no more a satisfactory answer 
in Timothy’s case than in that of the others’ (p. 19). He did not mention inter-
confessional polemics, in his letters where there are references to philosophical 
texts. And in the letters on Christological subjects there are no allusions too to 
                                                             
10  Cf. Martin Heimgartner, Die Briefe 42-58 des Ostyrischen Patriarchen Timotheos I, Textedition, (CSCO, 
644; Scriptores Syri, 248), Louvain: Peeters, 2012, p. 90; Id., Die Briefe 42-58 des Ostyrischen 
Patriarchen Timotheos I, Einleitung Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, (CSCO, 645; Scriptores Syri, 249), 
Louvain: Peeters, 2012, p. 76. 
11  Cf. Vittorio Berti, ‘Libri e biblioteche cristiane nell’Iraq dell’VIII secolo. Una testimonianza 
dell’Epistolario del patriarca siro-orientale Timoteo I (727-823)’, in D’Ancona (ed.), The Libraries 
of the Neoplatonists, pp. 307–317. 
12  Heimgartner, Die Briefe 42-58 … Textedition, pp. 67–68; Id., Die Briefe 42-58 … Einleitung Übersetzung 
und Anmerkungen, p. 51. 
13  Heimgartner, Die Briefe 42-58 … Textedition, p. 16; Id., Die Briefe 42-58 … Einleitung Übersetzung und 
Anmerkungen, p. 12. 
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philosophical logic—even if his Christological arguments are often in a syllogistic 
form.14 His sources are all biblical or patristic (he looked for these sources with 
the same effort he used to find philosophical sources). Dimitri Gutas15 suggested 
that his interest was inspired by a demand of translations for Muslim Arabic 
elites and his desire to integrate himself and his church with these elites.16  
According to Watt instead Timothy’s motivation was similar to that of his 
predecessors in the Syriac tradition. In four of his letters (16, 33, 37, 43) he 
declared his desire to have Dionysius in the translation of Athanasius or Phocas 
as he considered Aristotle’s philosophy ‘essential to “Dionysius’s philosophic and 
demonstrative” strand in the “tradition of the theologians”’. If it is intriguing to 
see some persistence of Sergius’s agenda in Timothy, I think it is necessary to 
investigate the differences more deeply, for example the total absence of any 
reference to Evagrius who is never mentioned or quoted by Timothy.17  
Watt ends his contribution examining the shared interest in Aristotelian 
philosophy of Christians and Muslims scholars in the ninth century through the 
analysis of the East Syrian Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, and then through the work of the 
Baghdad Aristotelians from the tenth century onwards. 
In al-Fārābī’s Appearance of Philosophy in Islam the appearance of the 
Aristotelianism of the ancient school of Alexandria is located in Baghdad thanks 
to the teaching of four East Syrian scholars. One of these scholars, al-Marwazī, 
the teacher of Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus, still wrote in Syriac.18 Even if it is true 
that the Baghdad Aristotelians from the tenth century resurrected in Arabic the 
                                                             
14  Cf. Sidney Harrison Griffith, ‘The Syriac Letters of Patriarch Timothy I and the Birth of Christian 
Kalām in the Mu‘tazilite Milieu of Baghdad and Basrah in Early Islamic Times’, in Wout van 
Bekkum, Jan Willem Drijvers and Alexander Cornelis Klugkist (eds), Syriac Polemics: Studies in 
Honour of Gerrit Jan Reinink, Peeters: Leuven 2007, pp. 103–132. 
15  Leonardo Tarán and Dimitri Gutas (eds), Aristotle. Poetics, Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2012, p. 87.  
16  As Vittorio Berti, Vita e studi di Timoteo I, patriarca cristiano di Baghdad, Paris–Louvain: Association 
pour l’avancement des études iraniennes–Peeters, 2009, pp. 172–173, very well shows in his 
book devoted to Timothy I, the patriarch attempt was more articulated: ‘Timoteo volle stare al 
centro del potere amministrativo del califfato e al cuore della nuova civiltà urbana islamica. 
Volle giocare la sua rappresentatività di capo di un’importante e radicata chiesa cristiana lì 
dove si organizzava la buona vita della ‘Umma, vicino ai cenacoli intellettuali che 
determinavano le prospettive culturali di lungo corso del grande impero, cercando di ricavarsi 
uno spazio di legittimità, lavorando per produrre la propria necessità sociale. Una scelta che 
segnala la piena presa di coscienza, se si può dire così, di essere minoranza, ma una minoranza 
che forse poteva rivendicare un preciso ruolo nel regno.’ 
17  Berti, Vita e studi di Timoteo I, p. 357. 
18  Most of this story is quite legendary (cf. Dimitri Gutas, ‘The “Alexandria to Baghdad” Complex 
of Narratives. A Contribution to the Study of Philosophical and Medical Historiography among 
the Arabs’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 10 (1999), pp. 155–193), but 
according to Watt ‘with the appearance of four named teachers in Baghdad (in contrast to the 
nameless actors who preceded them), one of whom (Yūḥannā ibn Ḥaylān) he (i.e. al-Fārābī) 
identifies as his own teacher, we step from fantasy into reality’ (p. 29, n. 84). 
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Aristotelian curriculum of the School of Alexandria, this idea has to be softened 
concerning the crowning Platonic curriculum. According to Watt there is still 
evidence of an interest in replacing Plato with pseudo-Dionysius for example in 
Ibn Zur‘a (d. 1008). ‘In a collection of responses to various questions that had 
been addressed to him, he explains why the names Father, Son and Spirit are 
employed instead of Intellect, Intelligizing and Intelligized (Meth. Lambda 9)’ (p. 
29): for veiling the divine realities from those who are unworthy, and, as 
Dionysius mentioned, for challenging the contemplatives who search for the 
truth.19  
The perspective of a Christian philosophical agenda suggested by Watt is the 
backstage of the following three contributions by Alexander Treiger, Ute 
Pietruschka, and Orsolya Varsányi. Treiger in ‘Palestinian Origenism and the 
Early History of the Maronites: in Search of the Origins of the Arabic Theology of 
Aristotle’ (pp. 44–80) presents two rival working hypotheses on the theological 
background—Melkite or Maronite—20 of ‘Abd al-Masīḥ al-Ḥimṣī, the Christian 
translator of a selection of Plotinus’s Enneads that forms the so-called Theology of 
                                                             
19  Watt states that al-Fārābī himself interpreted the terms of current Islamic religion as symbols 
for universally valid philosophical terms (p. 31) and he wonders whether al-Fārābī derives this 
idea from Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus’s reading of the Poetics where Aristotle was teaching 
philosophers how to project poetic images of these realities for the benefit of the multitude. 
Could this reading of the Poetics depend on the fundamental harmony recognized by the Syrian 
scholars between pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle and on pseudo-Dionysius’s symbolic 
theology? Al-Fārābī in his Philosophy of Aristotle (cf. al-Fārābī, Philosophy of Aristotle [Falsafat 
Arisṭūṭālīs wa-aǧzāʾ fa,lsafati-hi wa-marātib aǧzā’i-hā wa-l-mawḍiʿ allaḏī min-hu ibtadaʾa wa-ilayhī 
intahā], ed. Muhsin Mahdi, [Committee on Research in Arabic Philosophy, 1], Beirut: Dār 
Mağallat Šiʿr, 1961, pp. 84.3–19, 85.4–6) states that the theoretical things which are evident in 
themselves to the legislator are established in the souls of the multitude through an image and 
that Aristotle ‘gave an account of the art that enables man to project images of the things that 
became evident in certain demonstrations in the theoretical arts and to imitate them by means 
of their similitudes (Poetics)’. Al-Fārābī could read Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus’s translation of 
the Poetics. ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī claimed to have seen a long commentary of seventy 
volumes devoted by Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus to the eight books of Logic, including the 
Poetics: cf. Nanne Peter Josse, Between enigma and paradigm: The reception of Aristotle’s Politica in the 
Near East, in Vasileios Syros (ed.), Well Begun is Only Half Done: Tracing Aristotle’s Political Ideas in 
Medieval Arabic, Syriac, Byzantine, and Jewish Sources, (Arizona Center for Medieval and 
Renaissance Studies), Tempe: ACMRS, 2011, pp. 97–120, in particular pp. 104–105. With the texts 
available to us (we do not have Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus’s commentary on the Poetics) it is 
definitely more economical to think that this is a farabian original idea, which he constantly 
expresses in his works. 
20   Treiger himself suggests caution in his conclusion: ‘Of course, one can easily imagine 
alternative scenarios—for example, that al-Ḥimṣī received his Neoplatonic instruction in pagan 
circles in Ḥarrān, or that he derived his Origenism (and Neoplatonism) and/or his Greek 
manuscript of the Enneads from Egypt rather than Syria or Palestine, or that he was, after all, a 
Jacobite scholar who, quite exceptionally, sought out the Syriac Dionysius’s Greek Neoplatonic 
sources. I have to admit that, in the last analysis, all these alternative scenarios are possible and 
not disprovable’ (p. 73). 
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Aristotle. ‘Abd al-Masīḥ al-Ḥimṣī was native of Emesa, the Syrian city of Homs. Al-
Mas‘ūdī (d. 956) recognizes that the majority of Maronites in his time lived ‘in 
Homs and in regions subordinate to it, such as Hama, Shayzar and Ma‘arrat al-
Nu‘mān’ (p. 58, n. 52).  While Maronites seem to have been particularly present 
and strong in rural areas and monasteries (especially of course in Mar Maron), 
Jacobites had their own bishop in Homs. Treiger suggests that it is most likely 
that in a monastic milieu al-Ḥimṣī would have been exposed to Christian 
Neoplatonic texts. He disfavours the idea of a Jacobite monastery because the 
Jacobite scholars do not seem to have been involved in direct Graeco-Arabic 
translations and their knowledge of Plotinus was mediated by Dionysian corpus 
first in Greek and then in Syriac translation. If al-Ḥimṣī was not a Jacobite, he 
must have been a Chalcedonian. If he was a Melkite, he received his monastic 
training in Palestine, because Chalcedonian monasteries in Syria would have 
been predominantly Maronite. In the eight and ninth centuries the Greek-
speaking monks in Palestine were trained as translators—the Palestinian 
multilingual translation movement must be studied—and were still familiar with 
Origenist texts and Neoplatonic ideas (cf. the Palestinian treatise of eight/ninth 
century entitled Noetic paradise, p. 65). If he was a Maronite, it would have been 
easy for him to gain access to the library of the monastery of Mar Maron, a place 
where—given this monastery’s likely Origenist proclivities which Treiger 
stresses—a Greek manuscript of the Enneads could also possibly be found. The 
contribution ends with a desideratum: new research in the ‘intellectual 
geography of Middle Eastern Christianity in late antiquity and early Islamic 
period’ (p. 74) to gain better knowledge of the Christian translators’ crucial role 
in the formation of Arabic and Islamic philosophical tradition.  
In her ‘Some Observations about the Transmission of Popular Philosophy in 
Egyptian Monasteries after the Islamic Conquest’ (pp. 81–108), Ute Pietruschka 
presents a vivid picture on the transmission of ‘popular philosophy’ (in Brock’s 
terminology) in Egyptian Monasteries where the Coptic literature, immediately 
before and afterwards the Islamic Conquest, was preserved. The Copto-Arabic 
and Ethiopic literature blossomed benefiting from Syriac manuscripts and thus 
preserving old translations: several examples are taken from the collections of 
gnomologies.  
Orsolya Varsányi’s ‘The Concept of ʿaql in Early Arabic Christian Theology: A 
Case for the Early Interaction between Philosophy and kalām’ (pp. 109–34) sheds 
light on the use of the concept of intellect in ninth- century Arabic Christian 
authors such as ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī (d. c. 840), a Nestorian theologian, the Melkite 
Theodore Abū Qurra (d. c. 820–825), and the Jacobite Ḥabīb ibn Ḫidma Abū Rā’iṭa 
al-Takrītī (d. probably soon after 830). ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī came from Baṣra an 
important Nestorian centre of the age. His The book of the proof (Kitāb al-Burhān 
where burhān [‘proof’] means dialectical demonstration) and The book of the 
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questions and Answers (Kitāb al-Masā’il wa-l-ağwiba) are considered the most 
sophisticated texts of early Arabic Christian theology. The former is written in 
the form of hypothetical questions and answers that could be exchanged 
between (Nestorian) Christians and Muslim adversaries and concentrates on 
controversial issues such as the authenticity of the Bible, the question of the 
Trinity, the Incarnation, the sacraments, etc. It is divided into four sections each 
containing respectively 28, 14, 9 and 51 pairs of questions and answers. In the 
latter text intellect (ʿaql) is used in different contexts and with different 
meanings, which are: 1. a spiritual faculty or potency of the soul contrasted to 
bodily faculties whose tasks include the deliberate origination of bodily actions 
and the conceptualization of forms. Intellect assumes in this way an ethical value 
because ‘it can be a means of choice (iḫtiyār) as an essential prerequisite of free 
will’ (p. 114); 2. a quality of a good person together with ability (al-istiṭā‘a), and 
free will; 3. a part of human disposition created by God in men’s nature; 4. a 
distinction between rational and non-rational beings, which is not a substantial 
differentia (as life and inner speech), but which is the cause of effects as mercy, 
compassion, justice, gentleness, generosity and grace ‘that appear especially on 
behalf of rational and deliberate substances’.21 ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī’s definition of 
intellect is philosophical with theological influences. The author describes the 
complementarity of intellect and Scriptures in theological reasoning: the role of 
the intellect is that to grasp the signs of divine generosity, but it needs scriptural 
evidence in matter of faith. In addition, ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī also advocates the 
complementarity of intellect and the senses as a way of cognition, which begins 
from the physical evidence of bodily forms. 
The Melkite Theodore Abū Qurra was probably native in Edessa around 750 
and he seems to have been a monk in the Monastery of Mar Saba in the Judean 
desert. Later on, he became Bishop of Ḥarrān. He was the first Christian author to 
write his theological works in Arabic. He uses intellect in the Treatise on the 
existence of the creator and the true religion (Maymar fī wuğūd al-ḫāliq wa-l-dīn al-
qawīm) as a criterion to distinguish the true—that of the Christians—from the 
false religions without the help of the Scriptures. He begins his treatise with the 
description of the sources of knowledge and he distinguishes between the 
external senses and the interior intellect. Intellect, through the senses, knows 
parts of the world’s elements and the bodily forms which are perceived by the 
senses; it knows a very large thing which cannot be perceivable from its 
conceivable parts; and, similarly, it even knows things that are not seen from 
their traces and actions, as that the world is created by a Creator. In addition, 
intellect can recognize God’s action on the basis of the resemblance of His 
                                                             
21  ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-Masā’il, ed. Michael Hayek, Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1977, p. 158, see Janos 
(ed.), Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond, p. 118. 
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attributes to human virtues: thus, God is described as an intelligent and rational 
substance. Theodore Abū Qurra introduces an allegory to describe intellect and 
its role in recognizing the true religion: intellect appears as a doctor that God 
gave to humankind to know Him and distinguish what is right, licit, beautiful, 
and beneficial from what is wrong, illicit, and detestable. Man does not depend 
on revelation alone, but can rely on intellect. Man’s way of cognition includes 
two steps: the first one is intellectual reasoning, in the course of which one may 
arrive at specific results, the second is the comparison of the intellectual results 
with the revealed books; agreement shows which one to choose.  
Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī was the Jacobite Bishop of Takrīt or Nisibis in the 
beginning of ninth century and his native language was Syriac. In his Treatise on 
the ascertaining of the Christian faith and the Holy Trinity (Risāla fī iṯbāt al-dīn al-
naṣrānī wa iṯbāt al-ṯālūṯ al-muqaddas) one could expect a similar approach to that 
of Theodore, while on the contrary the author recognizes that intellect has limits 
and it cannot understand and validate the object of faith being it a theological 
question and not a philosophical one. God helps man in his quest for a true 
religion by giving signs and making miracles happen which go beyond reason. 
The editor of the volume Damien Janos contributes an article on ‘Active 
Nature and other Striking features of Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus’s cosmology as 
Reconstructed from his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics’ (pp. 135–177). Some 
features of the cosmology of the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā ibn Yūnus can be 
derived from the notes (ta‘ālīq) on Aristotle’s Physics which survive in the 
manuscript Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Or. 583, and which cover 
books II.3, III.2, plus parts of books V and VII of the Greek text. 
After a short overview of Abū Bišr Mattā’s contribution to Syriac and Arabic 
Aristotelism, Janos contextualizes his commentary on Physics in the philosophical 
culture of his time to better understand his original doctrinal approach, in 
particular to the concepts of causality, creation, and nature.  
Abū Bišr Mattā was one of the most important Arabic Christian thinkers 
between the ninth and tenth centuries, a leading teacher figure in the 
Aristotelian circle of Baghdad of his age. He was educated in the Monastery of 
Mār Mārī located about ninety kilometres from Baghdad. He translated from 
Syriac into Arabic parts of On the heavens, On generation and corruption, Meteorology, 
Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics Lambda often accompanied by the commentaries of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius. He wrote original commentaries such 
as the one on Physics. In addition, we have some of his notes on the Organon and 
Porphyry’s Isagoge. Most of his personal writings unfortunately are lost. What 
kind of causality does Abū Bišr Mattā ascribe to God and nature respectively in 
the production of material beings? What is the relationship between these two 
kinds of causality? 
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In his commentary on book II, Abū Bišr Mattā states that the task of physics is 
the study of the four causes—the material, formal, efficient, and final causes; 
mathematics, whose objects are without motion, matter and extra-mental 
existence focuses only on the formal cause; while metaphysics studies the 
unmoved efficient cause explicitly identified with God the Creator—whether we 
are dealing with eternal creation or creation in time is not explicitly stated—, the 
First Principle of human intellection—insofar He is the highest object of 
theoretical contemplation—, and the primary final cause that moves the entire 
world as an object of love. In this way God inspires the constant motions of the 
heavens, which in turn, through their own motions, influence the cycle of 
generation and corruption in the sublunary world.  
According to Abū Bišr Mattā, the celestial bodies, such as the Sun, are 
characterized by the formal cause, but do not possess matter strictly speaking, 
such as the sublunary matter, which receive different and even contradictory 
forms. They have a kind of substrate that holds their form, probably the 
potentiality of orbs and planets to receive form, to move circularly, and to be 
perceivable from earth. This doctrinal position is interesting because it seems to 
show a continuous exegetical trend on the subject of celestial matter from 
Alexander of Aphrodisias to Abū Bišr Mattā and al-Fārābī, who seems to follow 
the same position in his mature works. 
Since Brown and Genequand’s essays (respectively dated 1973 and 1984) some 
unidentified Neoplatonic sources have been recognized to explain Abū Bišr 
Mattā’s theory of nature.22 According to Abū Bišr Mattā, nature is a teleological 
‘principle of motion and rest that is internal to physical things and responsible 
for bringing about their actualization’ (p. 149). Abū Bišr Mattā often resorts to the 
analogy of the craftsman to describe how nature works: nature induces motion 
and applies form to an already existing material substrate to reach a given end. 
But, departing from Aristotle, he seems to ascribe a certain degree of rationality 
to nature and calls it an agent defining it as ‘active nature’ (al-ṭabī‘a al-fa‘‘āla): 
nature which is disseminated throughout all generated things has ‘an innate 
efficiency or power to effect change as a principle distinct from matter, form, and 
soul’ (p. 149). The most interesting example of ‘active nature’ which Abū Bišr 
Mattā uses five times is that of the animal semen: how does ‘the semen gradually 
develop to become a living and ensouled organism?’ (p. 151). 
                                                             
22  According to H. Vivian B. Brown, ‘Avicenna and the Christian Philosophers in Baghdad’, in 
Samuel M. Stern, Albert H. Hourani and Vivian Brown (eds), Islamic Philosophy and the Classical 
Tradition: Essays to Richard Walzer, Oxford–Columbia: Cassirer–University of South Carolina Press, 
1972, pp. 35–48, these unidentified Neoplatonic sources suggest the autonomy and efficiency of 
nature, while according to Charles Genequand, ‘Quelques aspects de l’idée de nature, d’Aristote 
à al-Ghazâlî’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie 116 (1984), pp. 105–129, they serve limit nature as 
a mere instrument of the soul. 
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This nature is present in the semen that is emitted. When the semen has 
established itself in the womb, [nature] converts [tuqallibuhū] it into a form and 
then into another form, so that the first form disappears, and then into another 
form still until the soul appears. [Nature] then stops its motion, but remains 
existing after this as an organizing and generating [principle] [mudabbira wa-
muwallida]. This nature does not act by way of similarity [‘alā sabīl al-tashbīh]. That 
is to say that it creates [tukawwinu] bone from non-bone [in the body]. As for the 
nature that proceeds by similarity, it is the nature that is present inside man, 
decomposing his nutrition by breaking it down into blood, flesh, and bone. This 
form that exists between the beginning [of the activity] of the semen and the 
appearance of the entire soul is like matter for the existence of the soul, because it 
is necessary for the existence of the soul and came about for its sake.23  
 
This example clearly shows ‘the autonomy of nature and of its priority over soul 
during the early existence of the embryo’ (p. 152) in its process of actualization 
into a human being. Hence the substantial form of a human being is the end that 
moves that teleological principle, which nature is, in the semen. Form, nature, 
soul are distinct concepts which carry on different operations. 
Does active nature also operate at the level of superlunary bodies? Abū Bišr 
Mattā states that ‘this nature is disseminated throughout all natural things on 
account of the Creator’,24 and he also states that  
 
the generable and corruptible body’s coming into contact with the heavenly body, 
[the heavenly body] affects it through this nature, and that [heavenly] body [is 
affected by] another [heavenly] body and the other by the motion of [i.e. caused 
by] the Creator.25  
 
Hence the provident Creator produces this active nature in the heavenly bodies 
and through the intermediary of the heavenly bodies in the sublunary world. 
According to Janos, the Arabic Plotinus and Proclus are not those unidentified 
Neoplatonic sources evocated by Brown and Genequand in order to explain Abū 
Bišr Mattā’s theory of nature because in the Arabic Plotinus and Proclus nature is 
always en-souled: soul is ‘the exterior cause for the existence of nature and the 
internal cause for its activity’ (p. 155). Abū Bišr Mattā’s original theory of nature 
                                                             
23   Arisṭūṭālīs, Al-Ṭabī‘a, Tarğamat Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn ma‘a šurūḥ Ibn al-Samḥ wa-Ibn ʿAdī wa-Mattā ibn 
Yūnus wa-Abī l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib, ed. ʿAbdurraḥmān Badawī, al-Qāhira: al-Dār al-qawmiyya li-l-
Ṭibā‘a wa-l-Našr, 1964–1965, vol. I, p. 151.7–15, Janos’s translation in Ideas in Motion in Baghdad 
and Beyond, p. 151. 
24  Arisṭūṭālīs, Al-Ṭabī‘a, vol. I, p. 147.19, Janos’s translation in Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond, 
p. 143. 
25  Arisṭūṭālīs, Al-Ṭabī‘a, vol. I, p. 151.5–7, Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman, Classical Arabic 
Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007, pp. 125–126. 
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has probably been shaped by a combination of Aristotle’s zoological treatises, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’s works, especially the Arabic Alexander’s On the 
principles of the cosmos. In the last part of the treatise Alexander describes a 
celestial nature and power that ‘are the cause of the unity and order of the world’ 
(as a teleological principle), which ‘pervade the whole world, and hold its parts 
together’.26 He states: ‘the nature penetrating all parts of the world is a divine 
power’,27 which is transmitted by the celestial bodies to the sublunary beings. In 
addition, Alexander considers nature the principle ‘underpinning the 
development of the embryo before the existence of the soul’ (p. 162): the 
operations of nature cease when the soul emerges in the embryo. Finally, to fully 
understand Abū Bišr Mattā’s account of the efficiency of nature we have to also 
consider Philoponus’s Commentary on Physics, parts of which are transmitted by 
manuscript Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Or. 583, which also 
transmitted Abū Bišr Mattā’s commentary. Janos observes that Abū Bišr Mattā 
and Philoponus share a similar language of creation and efficient causation to 
qualify the activity of nature and they adopted ‘a common strategy, inherited 
from Aristotle but amplified in their works, to rely on analogies between nature 
and the human crafts in order to stress its efficiency’ (pp. 165–167).  
Janos ends his contribution introducing examples of parallel doctrines to 
Mattā’s concept of active nature in other philosophers who were either his 
contemporaries or flourished shortly after—Isaac Israeli (d. 955) and al-‘Āmirī (d. 
992)—and a critical remark by Avicenna to an unnamed commentator for adding 
doctrinal accretions to Aristotle’s concept of nature. From Janos’s accurate and 
insightful analysis Abū Bišr Mattā appears to be less a mere transmitter of 
ancient philosophical learning than an active protagonist of the tenth century 
philosophical debate in Arabic.  
The magisterial contribution by Gerhard Endress—‘Theology as a Rational 
Science: Aristotelian Philosophy, the Christian Trinity and Islamic Monotheism in 
the Thought of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’ (pp. 221–252)—is the first of four papers devoted 
to another protagonist of the tenth-century Arabic philosophical debate, the 
Nestorian Christian Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 974),28 by Endress himself, Olga Lizzini, 
David Bennett with Robert Wisnovsky and Carmela Baffioni.  
Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī was a leading figure of the open society of tenth-century 
Baghdad where, as Endress observes, courts, observatories, hospitals, libraries 
and book markets were the stages of philosophical and theological exchanges. A 
mosaic of traditions included Arabs, Iranians, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sabians 
                                                             
26  Charles Genequand (ed.), Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 112–113. 
27   Ibid., pp. 114–115. 
28  Gerhard Endress, The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī. An Analytical Inventory, Wiesbaden: Dr. L. Reichert 
Verlag, 1977. 
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moved on these stages all in search of scholarly and social pre-eminence. Lizzini 
writes:  
 
Fourth-/tenth-century Baghdad was not only a centre of understanding and 
cooperation, but also of criticism and debate. Nonetheless, Muslim, Christian and 
Jewish scholars spoke the common language of Greek science and Aristotelian 
logic. And the significance of this interaction of languages, religions, and points of 
view is clearly perceptible in Yaḥyā, who could be defined as a characteristic 
figure of the climate of communication of his period’ (p. 257).  
 
Endress presents Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s philosophical project which, following the 
teaching of Mattā, considers the Aristotelian science of demonstration, with its 
criticism of non-demonstrative procedures, as the universal criteria of rational 
discourse. On this basis Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī founded his epistemology and on which he 
arrived at designing ‘a universal theology, monotheist and creationist, a theology 
claiming the rank of rational science, supported by apodictic proofs and refuting 
the claims of his critics—the theologians of the kalām—with the weapons of logic’ 
(p. 227).  
In order to discuss Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s account of the first principle of his rational 
theology Endress analyses the treatise On the affirmation of the [divine] unity (Al-
Maqāla fī l-tawḥīd), which is also at the core of Lizzini’s contribution ‘What Does 
Tawḥīd Mean? Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s Treatise on the Affirmation of the Unity of God 
between Philosophy and Theology’ (pp. 253–280). In this treatise, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī 
presents an implicit critique of the Muslim creed, declaring the absolute unity 
(al-tawḥīd) of God. The aim of the treatise is both theological (to account for God’s 
nature) and apologetic (to defend the Christian account of God from the charge of 
polytheism). But Endress and Lizzini agree that to consider this treatise only 
among Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s apologetic and polemical writings is reductive.  
The distinction of the two meanings of the label ‘unity’, namely ‘oneness’ and 
‘uniqueness’ lies at the core of the short treatise, in which Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī follows 
two different approaches: first he enumerates the various meanings of the term 
‘one’; second he analyses the theological implications of this notion in order to 
obtain ‘a Trinitarian formulation of divine unity, which, in contrast to the 
absolute doctrine of Islam, reveals a relative or “modulated” understanding of 
monotheism’ (p. 257). In Lizzini’s contribution there is an appendix with a very 
useful and rich divisio textus (pp. 271–280) and she suggests some of the possible 
theological and philosophical sources, which inspired Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī in his 
analysis.  
Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī addresses the following question ‘if and in what respect 
plurality (of attributes) may be predicated of the Creator’ (p. 232). On the model 
of Metaphysics Delta 6 he states that One, the first cause, is one, neither as a genus, 
nor as a species, nor by virtue of some relation, nor as a continuous or indivisible 
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being. One is one qua substance and it has a plurality only in virtue of the 
constituent parts of its definition, i.e., the attributes that may be predicated of 
the divine essence. These attributes are three and they are deduced from His 
creation, i.e., from his activity: generosity, power and wisdom.  
All created beings are brought into existence from non-existence through the 
power of Creator; the spontaneous and voluntary act of creation reveals His 
generosity. ‘His wisdom, finally, is manifest in the order and perfection of His 
work’ (p. 233). Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī uses these cardinal attributes of the Triune God, 
which trace back to pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and before to Proclus’s 
primary divine triad, in his own doctrine of hypostases: ‘the hypostases are not 
individuals partaking in a homogeneous substance, and constituted by 
composition with specific differentiae’ (p. 235). The divine substance is one; the 
hypostases are essential attributes describing this sole substance ‘in its eternal 
essence as being good (“Father”), wise (“Son”) and mighty (“Spirit”)’ (p. 235). 
Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī in his other philosophical and polemical works interprets the First 
Cause, God, as First Intellect (Father, ʿaql) who thinks itself (Holy Spirit, maʿqul) 
and equals its thinking (Son, ʿāqil): ‘these three aspects are inseparable in the 
One, because the Intellect is inseparable from its knowing and from the object of 
its knowledge, separable only in the approach of logical distinction’ (p. 235).  
In order to exemplify Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s logical refutation of the Muslim 
theologians, Endress presents Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s discussion of the favoured topoi of 
his Ash‘arite contemporaries. Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī wants to establish the contingentia 
futura against those who, invoking the prescience and omnipotence of God and 
the universal validity of the principle of non-contradiction, deny potentiality and 
future contingency. Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s adversaries maintain that God knows 
everything eternally. ‘Since the object of knowledge is coextensive with the 
knower qua knower’ (p. 238), it must be unchanging because there is no change in 
the knower. Everything He knows to exist cannot become non-existent. ‘There is 
no potentiality in rerum natura’ (p. 238). Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī maintains that this 
argument works if we consider God’s prescience the cause of necessity, but it is 
not a causa materialis, or formalis, or efficiens, or finalis, or instrumentalis, or 
exemplaris for the things to be of necessity. In addition, he states that ‘the 
knowledge of the essence of a thing is different from the knowledge of the 
essence of the thing existent’ (p. 239). Hence there is no change in the knower in 
virtue of coming-to-be of the object known. The possible has neither eternal 
existence nor eternal non-existence.  
Second, Endress gives as examples of logical procedures against kalām Yaḥyā 
ibn ‘Adī’s refutation of the human acquisition of acts originated by God (iktisāb), a 
doctrine that according to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī leads to contradictions. If the 
acquisition of the act by man is an act, mediating between God’s creation of the 
act and its execution by the muktasib, as an act, in its turn, it must be created by 
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God and again acquired by man, and so on in a recessus ad infinitum. On the 
contrary if both the act and its acquisition were created by God without any 
mediation of the individual agent all acts would be of all men because there 
would be nothing to determine one man for acquiring a particular act.  
Third, Endress discusses Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s critique of atomism based on 
Aristotle’s Physics which is preserved in three treatises edited by him in 198429 
and in a fourth one survived in MS Tehran, Madrasa-yi Marwī 19,30 and edited and 
translated for the first time by David Bennett and Robert Wisnovsky in this 
volume (‘A Newly Discovered Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī Treatise against Atomism’, pp. 298–
311). Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī depends on Aristotle’s Physics, but the question of atomism 
also has theological implications: atomism was a solution proposed by the 
Muslim theologian to explain God’s omnipotence and omniscience. Yaḥyā ibn 
ʿAdī’s arguments insist on the fact that spatial extension presupposes elementary 
magnitudes with ends or extremities that can meet (successive), get into contact 
(contiguous), or unite (continuum). Indivisibles have no parts and no extremities 
that can join, thus it is impossible that they give rise to continuous magnitudes as 
the bodies evidently are. In the first treatise, entitled Explaining that every 
continuum can be divided into divisible parts; it is impossible that it be divided into 
indivisible parts (cf. Aristotle, Physics VI.1, 231b16), Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī explains 
Aristotle’s proof: everything which undergoes a process must be divisible:  
 
‘part of that which is in movement or change must be at the starting point, and 
part at the goal, for as a whole cannot be in both or in neither. Thus a continuous 
magnitude moving along a straight line is divided into divisible parts in virtue of 
its procession by any place given on that line’ (p. 244).  
 
In the second treatise, entitled Every continuum can be divided into things divisible ad 
infinitum, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī gives Aristotle’s definition of successive, contiguous and 
continuous and the verbatim translation of Proclus’s first five propositions from 
Elements of Physics which Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s quotes anonymously. Then he refers to 
Euclid’s Elements book I where Euclid describes a method to divide a line in two 
halves and he takes this to presuppose that every line can be divided into two 
halves (Euclid does not state this axiom). Since every line can be divided into 
halves, a line cannot be composed of indivisible points, otherwise odd points 
would have to be divisible. In the third treatise, entitled On the indivisible part, he 
                                                             
29   Gerhard Endress, ‘Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s Critique of Atomism. Three Treatises on the Indivisible Part’, 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften 1 (1984), pp. 155–179.  
30  In this manuscript, among the 53 treatises by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī that it contains, there are 25 that 
scholars thought had been lost: cf. Robert Wisnovsky, ‘New Philosophical Texts of Yaḥyā ibn 
ʿAdī: A Supplement to Endress’ Analytical Inventory’, in Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman 
(eds), Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, Leiden: Brill, 
pp. 307–326. 
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presents the ‘mustard seed argument’, a Islamic theological argument: if infinite 
division of the continuous bodies were possible, a small mustard seed could be 
divided into so many parts that it covered the whole of the celestial sphere 
because it would have as many infinite parts as the sky. In the fourth treatise, 
entitled A Treatise debunking the fraud of those who profess the composition of bodies 
out of indivisible parts, with respect to their arguments concerning the contact between a 
sphere and a flat surface at a particular point and its movement thereupon (Maqalā fī 
tazyīf tadlīs al-qāʾilīn bi-tarkīb al-ağsām min ağzāʾ lā tatağazzaʾ bi-ḥtiğāğihim bi-mulāqāt 
al-kura al-basīṭ al-musaṭṭaḥ ʿalā nuqṭatihi wa-ḥarakatihā ʿalayhi), Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī ‘adds 
the “sphere-touching–the plane” critique to the anti–atomist repertoire at hand 
in tenth century Baghdad’ (p. 299). The advocates of atomism argue that it is 
evident to the senses that if a sphere is moved on a plane, the two figures have in 
common only a point: the sphere touches the plane only on the indivisible point. 
And, since there can be a local continuous movement of the sphere rolling across 
the plane, the sphere will touch the plane continuously, indivisible point after 
indivisible point and the indivisible points of contact of the sphere with the plane 
will be the finite measure of this plane exhausting it completely. The conclusion 
is the following: all that is divisible into a finite number cannot be infinitely 
divided. This contradicts Aristotle’s theory of the composition of continuous 
magnitudes on which, as mentioned above, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī insists. Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī 
states that from  
 
their assumption that parts are indivisible, it necessarily follows that parts cannot 
be combined with other parts except in a straight line. So it is therefore necessary 
that there cannot be a circular form. Yet it is clear that the sphere is a circular 
form. Yet it is necessary on account of their assumption that there is absolutely 
not a sphere. And if there is no sphere, it is not possible for a sphere to move upon 
a surface, or upon anything else. Thus, their assertion that the sphere touches the 
surface when it is moving upon the surface is nonsense. It was on this that their 
argument was based. Thus we judge their argument false, and demonstrate its 
falsity, on the basis of their own method and principles (p. 308).  
 
In addition, the sphere rolls across the plane along the points of an imagined 
coplanar line without exhausting the plane. The ‘sphere-touching–the plane’ 
argument was analysed by Avicenna and Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. As Endress says in 
his conclusion, ‘his way of formalizing intricate problems in the shape of 
elaborate syllogisms was to become a hallmark of the Arabic Aristotle, even 
though the name of Ibn ʿAdī the teacher was obliterated, and outshone by those 
who stood on his shoulders’ (p. 247). 
Carmela Baffioni’s chapter ‘Movement as “Discrete”: Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī as a 
Source for the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ?’ (pp. 281–297) sheds light on the unusual 
representation in the well-known Encyclopedia. Two passages from Epistle 7 and 
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11 of the Rasā’il Iḫwān al-Ṣafā’ are analysed, where line, surface, solid, space and 
time are considered the five species of continuum, and number and motion are 
given as examples of discrete quantities. In Aristotle’s Physics, motion is 
considered as a continuum, and continuous motion is stated to exist before all 
other movements; it is local, circular, perpetual and without interruption, while 
rectilinear motion cannot be continuous being produced by a single motionless 
agent in a single moving thing which is a dimensional magnitude. Baffioni 
maintains that the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ departed from Aristotle probably under the 
influence of Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 835–845) a Mu‘tazilite theologian and poet, 
and she wonders whether the Iḫwān al-Ṣafā’ could had been influenced by the 
much later Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, with his idea of ‘instant’ in motion. Even if Baffioni is 
cautious and concludes ‘it is more likely that Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s and the Ikhwān al-
Ṣafā’s works reflect the discussions in progress in the tenth century about capital 
issues such as motion, space, and time’ (p. 296).   
There are only two papers that do not concern the Arabic Christian tradition 
and one is Philippe Vallat’s ‘Between Hellenism, Islam, and Christianity: Abū Bakr 
al-Rāzī and his Controversies with Contemporary Mu‘tazilite Theologians as 
Reported by the Ash‘arite Theologian and Philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’ (pp. 
178–220). Some years ago, Marwan Rashed collected from the Advanced 
investigations into theology (Maṭālib al-‘āliya min al-‘ilm al-ilāhī), a nine-volume 
encyclopaedic theological work, by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), some fragments 
in which Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925) is quoted by name.31 These fragments are taken 
from Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s Divine science (Al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī) and from one of the epistles 
that he wrote in his long controversy with Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī, known as Kaʿbī, a 
Muʿtazilite theologian who died in 933. Vallat collects new textual evidence (a set 
of nineteen fragments of which he offers the translation and commentary) where 
Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī seems to quote Abū Bakr al-Rāzī without naming him. 
According to Vallat, they contain Abū Bakr’s refutation of the very idea of 
Koranic prophecy, and maintain that reason is self-sufficient for all that ought to 
be known for human beings to reach salvation, a tenet that makes prophecy 
superfluous.32 God’s pure goodness is in contrast to Koranic God’s omnipotence. 
The Omnipotent God of Koran can only be violent in some way. And violence is 
destructive of reason, which is based on God’s goodness. Hence ‘between reason 
and violence, a choice must be made. One cannot retain both’ (p. 179).  
                                                             
31  Marwan Rashed, ‘Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et le kalām’, Mélanges de l’Institut Dominicain d'Études Orientales 
du Caire 24 (2000), pp. 39–54; Id., ‘Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et la prophétie’, Mélanges de l’Institut 
Dominicain d'Études Orientales du Caire 27 (2008), pp. 169–181. 
32  Rashed, ‘Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et le kalām’, pp. 39–54; Rashed, ‘Abū Bakr al-Rāzī et la prophétie’, pp. 
169–181, offered a contrary account and maintains that Abū Bakr al-Rāzī believed that Koran 
and Its prophecy were acceptable because they agree with reason. Of a different opinion, 
similar to that of Vallat, is Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr 
al-Rāzī, and their Impact on Islamic Thought, Leiden: Brill, 1999. 
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According to Abū Bakr’s theory the world is produced out of an interaction 
between God and four eternal principles: soul, matter, space and time.  
 
‘Matter is endowed with a kind of residual causality that not only precludes its 
coming perfectly informed by the Soul, but also its being perfectly ordered by God. 
For the en-souled beings resulting from the fall of the Soul into Matter, the latter’s 
residual causality is visible in the suffering and afflictions inherent to their en-
mattered condition’ (p. 186).  
 
God is in no way responsible for the evil, which arise from human en-mattered 
existence. The merciful God did not attempt to forbid the Soul to join with 
Matter, but let her do so because Soul will learn through experience the evil of its 
conjunction with Matter.  
The individuated souls can experience the goodness of God by becoming 
aware that they do not belong here below. Reason is the only instrument of 
salvation because the merciful ‘God does not charge his creatures with a burden 
beyond their force’ (p. 190). Reason can reach a judgement for all the acts that 
ought to be performed or not for the sake of human salvation. Reason is 
sufficient to acquire the knowledge of God, of what is obligatory, permissible and 
forbidden. Hence the mission of prophets has no utility. If the criterion thanks to 
which man assesses a univocal conception of God’s goodness is not reason, there 
is no interreligious debate at all and the only one result is scepticism.  
 
The Creator then poured forth upon the Soul’s substance the light of Reason in 
order that the Soul, thanks to the faculty of the light of Reason and thanks to the 
reiterated experiences of the grievous states of the world, shall learn that there is 
no intrinsic utility at all in her connection with such a matter, and that, on the 
contrary, her connection with it amounts to opening the door to afflictions and 
dreads. When then she becomes aware of these spiritual facts [ma‘ānī] and it 
appears to her that her greater felicity consists of returning toward the world that 
is hers, and in delighting in the knowledge of the Creator and in entering the 
assembly of the holy and immaculate spirits, this desire and inclination toward 
matter will then leave her. And when she is separated from the body, she will 
abide in these perpetual joys33 (p. 199). 
 
Abū Bakr espoused the view of a universal revelation (ilhām) through the 
dispensation of reason to all human beings and to all living beings including 
animals. ‘Universal revelation is God’s bestowing the light of reason on the fallen 
Soul. It is a proof of God’s pure benevolence’ (p. 205). What is contrary to reason 
is contrary to God’s nature given that God cannot act against his own gift. The 
                                                             
33  Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya fī ‘ilm al-ilāhī, ed. Hejazi Al-Saqa, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-
ʿArabī, 1987, vol. IV, pp. 415.16–416.1.  
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merciful God inspires his servants with the knowledge of what is profitable for 
them. He does not give preference to some over others; thus there is no discord 
between them and any violence.  
 
Such is a much better way to protect them than making some of them the Imams 
of the others, for in this latter case every religious community declares his Imam 
truthful and the Imam of the others mendacious, then they come to blows, them 
some of them gain a reputation by stabbing the others so affliction becomes 
general and by dint of injustices and fights, they bring about their own ruin. Too 
many men have already lost their life in this manner, as we all can notice it (p. 
206).  
 
Abū Bakr’s most convincing praise of reason is in his Spiritual Physics,34 which 
Vallat compares with the Ḥarrānian Thābit ibn Qurra’s praise of Hellenic 
intellectual heathenism partly preserved in its Syriac original by Ibn al-‘Ibrī.35 
The two texts present striking similarities not only in the rhetorical epidictic 
style but also in contents (cf. p. 209). This text shows that ‘God’s gift of reason to 
all human beings has historically been manifested and adduced by all the 
achievements of Hellenic intellectuality down the ages’ (p. 210). Abū Bakr goes 
even further making reason the instrument of human knowledge of God and in 
doing so opens the debate between religious Hellenism and revealed religions. 
This debate deserves further inquiries, which however must be kept away from 
the deforming lens of certain contemporary ideological readings according to 
which paganism would be hospitable and peaceful with respect to 
monotheisms.36 
The last contribution, David Twetten’s long article ‘Aristotelian Cosmology 
and Causality in Classical Arabic Philosophy and Its Greek Background’ (pp. 312–
412), is devoted to the problem of how God exerts causation in creating the world 
in Arabic-Islamic philosophy of the classical age. Mullā Ṣadrā is the only 
postclassical author considered except for some cursory references to ‘Abd al-
                                                             
34  Arthur J. Arberry, The Spiritual Physics of Rhazes, London: John Murray, 1950. 
35  Cf. David Pingree, ‘The Sabians of Harran and the Classical Tradition’, International Journal of the 
Classical Tradition 9/1 (2002), pp. 8–35.  
36  Jan Assmann, Non avrai altro Dio. Il monoteismo e il linguaggio della violenza, Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2007. According to the author, monotheism has been a promoter of a new form of violence, 
unknown to the polytheistic religions, since monotheism has directly invoked the divine will. In 
particular, while with polytheism every divinity of a religion was ‘translatable’ by its 
characteristics in the deity of another religion, with monotheism the religion of the other 
became the affirmation of a non-truth, the ‘enemy of God’, ‘the most important generator of 
extraneousness and hatred’. Monotheisms institutionalized violence (cf. the figures of the 
martyr and the fanatic who kills for God). Assmann seems to believe that religion is a condition 
of human existence, not a factual fact in time and space (the existence of conceptions that we 
would define as religious in every human society).  
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Laṭīf al-Baghdādī. Twetten traces the continuity between late ancient Greek and 
Arabic cosmologies: both transformed Aristotle’s unmoved mover to fit with 
Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides, the crowning part of Neoplatonic curriculum. 
Ammonius and Simplicius were the first to transform the prime mover into a 
demiurgic efficient cause of the existence of the heavens, labelled here an onto-
poietik cause: ‘a cause that efficiently produces what is below it from eternity, 
without presupposing even matter’ (p. 408). They considered the prime mover 
the first of the separate intellects, which is between the One and Soul and moves 
the en-souled spheres. In the Christian Neoplatonism of Philoponus and of the 
pseudo-Dionysius the One and the prime mover were identified with God, who 
creates the cosmos timelessly and without change with noting presupposed, yet 
at a first moment in time. Thus the Arabic philosophers inherited two different 
paradigms of God’s creation. According to the first, God is a creator of a cosmos 
possessing a first moment in time. According to the second, God is an onto-poietik 
first cause. Twetten’s outline of the history of Arabic classical cosmology 
describes as 
 
‘a shift from the creationist “Aristotle” of al-Kindī to the derivationist “Aristotle” 
of the mature al-Fārābī and the effort at getting at the true Aristotle and the true 
Aristotelian philosophy results, for example, not only in Maimonides’s denial of 
creationism to Aristotle, but also in Averroes’s denial of ontopoiesis’ (p. 408).  
 
This provoking volume draws a picture of great interest that certainly will lead to 
a rethinking of the role of Christian intellectuals from the sixth to the tenth 
centuries in the development of Arabic Islamic thought. On the example of 
Endress’s studies on Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, which in a sense inaugurated this line of 
research, Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond restores the dignity of the 
Christian Arabic philosophical tradition by reading its protagonists as true 
intellectuals, who were moved by their own agenda, rather than as translation 
professionals. This re-reading, in turn, is useful in framing better Muslim 
philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna. This volume shows that it is still 
time of analysis of the prosopography and contexts of many Christian and 
Muslim authors and of both direct and indirect tradition of their writings rather 
than syntheses.  
